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Abstract  
 
With a pair of oppositely valenced stimuli, rating the first one sometimes leads to a more 
extreme evaluation for the second (e.g., if the second is negatively valenced, rating the first 
stimulus would lead to a more negative rating for the second; White et al., 2014). We 
considered an evaluation bias in the case of clinical diagnosis relating to eating disorders. A 
population sample which included experienced clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, 
showed partial evidence of an evaluation bias, when judging descriptions of individuals 
designed to be consistent with eating disorders or not. Quantum probability theory, the 
probability rules from quantum mechanics without any of the physics, is particularly well-
suited to modeling the evaluation bias (and constructive influences generally), because a 
measurement (or judgement) can change the state of the system. We applied a previous 
quantum model to the present result, an extension of the model embodying noisy processes, 
and Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief adjustment model. We discuss how model fits 
inform an examination of rationality in the observed behavior.  
 
key words: evaluation bias, constructive influences, quantum probability theory, clinical 








 1.1 How does the process of judgment affect the outcome? 
 Consider a clinical psychologist evaluating different pieces of information about a 
patient. After each piece of evidence, the clinician might offer a judgment. It would be 
unsurprising to observe that these judgments develop in a way consistent with the presented 
information. What would be surprising is if the process of making a judgment affects the 
clinician’s perception that the patient is ill or not. From a folk perspective, surely the rational 
expectation is that the clinician determines the patient to be ill or not on the basis of the 
available evidence, not on whether any intermediate judgments are made or not.  
 In fact, it has been well-known for a while that intermediate judgments can impact on 
an eventual conclusion. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) systematized a large body of research 
showing that, when evaluating a sequence of pieces of evidence, step-by-step (SbS; an 
intermediate judgment is made after each piece of evidence) vs. end-of-sequence (EoS; a 
single judgment is made after all pieces of evidence) modes of evaluation sometimes result in 
different overall conclusions. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) considered long series of pieces of 
evidence (the ‘short’ series corresponded to sequences between 2 and 16) and it is possible 
that the impact of intermediate judgments in their analysis simply relates to e.g. memory 
reinforcement effects. However, there is evidence that just a single judgment can alter 
corresponding beliefs (Ariely & Norton, 2008; Brehm, 1956; Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 
2010). Such findings can be called ‘constructive influences’, because the judgment appears to 
alter (construct) the relevant mental state.  
 We focus on the evaluation bias (White, Pothos, and Busemeyer, 2014). In a typical 
experiment, participants would be presented with pairs of stimuli having opposite affective 
valence, positive (P) or negative (N). The second stimulus in each pair would always be rated. 
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The first stimulus would be sometimes be rated, sometimes offered just for observation. 
White et al. (2014) found that rating the first stimulus would lead to a more extreme rating for 
the second stimulus (i.e., if the second stimulus was N, it would be rated as more negative 
etc.). Thus, for the same two stimuli presented in the same order, judging the first stimulus 
would alter participants’ perception for the second one in a systematic way. However, White 
et al.’s (2014) work, as well as most related research, concerns low stakes decision situations, 
with college undergraduate participants (an exception is White et al., 2020). It is possible that 
judgment biases, such as the evaluation bias, disappear when the judgment situation 
sufficiently engages thoughtful, considerate decision processes (Kahneman, 2001).  
  
 1.2 Rationality and biases in clinical diagnosis 
 We expect clinical diagnosis to be as rational as possible, and this includes 
expectations concerning the extent of information about the patient and expertise of the 
clinician. However, there is a more fundamental requirement for rationality, if one recognises 
that clinical diagnosis is probabilistic inference on uncertain premises. Probabilistic inference 
is based on rules for how to combine different pieces of information and update the 
probability of a target conclusion (e.g., whether a patient is ill or not). The established rational 
standard for doing so is Bayesian probability theory (Oaksford & Chater, 2009; Tenenbaum et 
al., 2011). Using Bayesian principles, a reasoner benefits from powerful convergence and 
consistency/ coherence arguments.  
 Bayesian theory is not the only probability theory. Quantum theory is the probability 
rules from quantum mechanics, without any of the physics. It has been applied in behavioral 
modeling, when baseline Bayesian models appear problematic (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; 
Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). One of the key rational justifications for 
Bayesian theory applies to quantum theory as well (Pothos et al., 2017). But, if both Bayesian 
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theory and quantum theory can benefit from the same rational justification, and sometimes 
diverge in their prediction, which theory do we choose to judge some behavior as rational vs. 
not? The answer to this question depends on which probability theory better describes the 
situation at hand.  
 We introduce the distinction between compatible and incompatible questions. 
Compatible questions are ones which can be resolved concurrently. For incompatible 
question, this is not possible, e.g., because the meaning of one question might alter the 
meaning of the other or because just asking one question might change or disturb the system 
of interest. An example is the pair of questions ‘how is your exams revising going’ and ‘what 
will you do Friday night’ for a teenager. Regardless of the answer, just asking the first 
question might make the teenager anxious, thus altering response probabilities for the second 
question. That is, the two questions are incompatible because in this case asking one question 
changes/ disturbs the relevant system (the teenager).  
  Bayesian theory is rational for compatible questions and quantum theory for 
incompatible questions. Can we simply consider the consistency of any judgment with 
Bayesian principles (for compatible questions) or quantum principles (for incompatible 
questions) and so make a determination regarding its rational status? There are three 
complications. First, a technical issue is that quantum theory works for compatible questions 
too, but in that case it mostly reproduces Bayesian theory; and Bayesian theory can 
accommodate some features of incompatibility (e.g., with conditionalizing), but quantum 
theory is better suited to inference with incompatible questions. Second, Bayesian and 
quantum theories are complex mathematical frameworks and it is difficult to disprove them 
(cf. Jones & Love, 2011). Quantum theory, Bayesian theory and any general framework for 
computational modeling are general enough to be flexed to cover any results. But, of course, 
not all models would be convincing to the scientific community for other reasons, for 
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example, concerning the degree to which model assumptions are reasonable and well-
motivated. Third, there have been proposals for how to reconcile Bayesian theory with 
apparent inconsistencies, if, for example, resource limitations (Lieder & Griffiths, 2019) or 
conversational implicatures (Goodman & Frank, 2016) are taken into account.  
 Notwithstanding these issues, we can examine whether ‘reasonable’ Bayesian vs. 
quantum models might be more appropriate in an experimental situation and whether human 
behavior follows the relevant principles (cf. Shepard, 1992). Our focus is the presence or not 
of an evaluation bias in clinical diagnosis of eating disorders, with participants including 
highly experienced clinical psychologists and psychiatrists.  
 Clinical diagnosis is a demanding task. Several studies indicate that the use of 
diagnosis and treatment manuals does not enhance diagnostic accuracy (Huppert et al., 2001; 
Norcross, 2002), but also that few professionals actually follow the available 
recommendations and guidelines (Currin et al., 2007; Lilienfeld et al., 2013). The relation 
between experience and diagnostic validity has also been investigated. Perhaps surprisingly, 
there is evidence that professionals are sometimes just as accurate as graduate students 
(Hermann et al., 1999; Muller & Davids, 1999). Studies on illusory correlations, which occur 
when a person believes that events are correlated, even though they really are not, further 
suggest it can be difficult for clinicians to learn from clinical experience (Garb, 1998).  
 It is well-known that clinical judgment is not immune to apparent cognitive biases 
(Garb, 2003). For example, research on covariation misestimation suggests that mental health 
professionals are more likely to remember instances in which a test indicator and symptom 
are present than those in which a test indicator is absent and a symptom is either present or 
absent (Kayne & Alloy, 1988). Another example concerns reports that the act of making a 
diagnosis can influence how a mental health professional remembers a client’s symptoms 
(Arkes & Harkness, 1980). That is, mental health professionals may forget that a client has 
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particular symptom because the symptom is not typical of those associated with the client’s 
diagnosis.  
 Evidence for apparent biases in clinical judgment contrasts with recommendations for 
best practice. Currently there is an emphasis on using evidence-based practice in psychology 
(EBPP; Cierpiałkowska & Sęk, 2016; APA, 2006). The purpose of EBPP is to promote 
effective psychological practice by applying empirically supported principles of psychological 
assessment, case formulation, therapeutic relationship, and intervention (Bauer, 2007). Some 
of the components of EBPP are (a) assessment and diagnostic judgment; (b) clinical decision-
making; (c) appropriate evaluation and use of research evidence. At the diagnostic stage, 
EBPP focuses on searching for answers that would enable correct diagnosis and estimating 
the probability that a patient has a particular disorder. The EBPP recommends scientific 
methods and independently verifiable facts as much as possible, as opposed to e.g. personal 
intuitions, but it falls short of providing tools for clinical inference using Bayesian theory 
(Straus et al., 2011; Youngstrom, 2013).  
 The present focus on eating disorders concerns our (BW, BI) experience in the area, 
the availability of case studies, and access to professional populations. Eating disorders can be 
serious and debilitating mental illnesses, characterized by preoccupation with one's body 
weight and shape. The incidence of eating disorders is on the increase, especially anorexia 
and bulimia nervosa for younger women in Europe (Garner, 2004), including in Poland, 
which is where the present study was carried out (Izydorczyk, 2011a, 2013). The 
differentiation between the various types of eating disorders (e.g., bulimia, anorexia nervosa, 
or compulsive overeating/binge eating) is performed using criteria corresponding to medical 
classifications of diseases and behavioral disorders (Cierpiałkowska & Sęk, 2016).  
 
 1.3 An evaluation bias in the diagnosis of eating disorders   
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 The finding of Arkes and Harkness (1980), that making a diagnosis can influence the 
memory for particular symptoms, shows that making a judgment vs. not can impact on 
subsequent judgments, even when the presented information is identical. We can understand 
such results as constructive influences, when a judgment can change the underlying mental 
state (Gloekner et al., 2009; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Sharot et al., 2010).  
 Baseline Bayesian theory is fairly uninformative concerning constructive influences. 
We can write 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ≠
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡), but how does knowledge of the first 
judgment impact on the second one? It could reduce, increase, or not affect the probability of 
the second judgment. An analogous argument can be offered when considering whether 
Bayesian theory provides an accurate description of situations when judgments or 
measurements alter the system (as for the example of the revising, anxious teenager). In 
quantum theory, constructive influences arise fairly naturally. To explain how this occurs, we 
briefly introduce quantum theory.  
 The starting point in a quantum model is a multidimensional space, where all possible 
questions are represented as subspaces. For example, in Figure 1, we have a two-dimensional 
overall space corresponding to all the questions a clinician could be asking about a patient. In 
that space we represent one question: does the patient suffer from an eating disorder vs. not.  
The mental state of the clinician is represented by a normalized (i.e., length 1) vector, 𝜓. 
Probability for a question outcome is the squared length of the ‘projection’ of the mental state 
vector, to the subspace corresponding to the question outcome. For example, to compute the 
probability that the clinician considers the patient having the disorder, we project (lay down) 
the vector 𝜓 onto the disorder subspace and compute the square of the length of this 
projection. So, higher overlap between the mental state vector and different subspaces 
indicates higher probability.  
Constructive biases 9 
 What happens if the clinician considers the evidence and then decides that the patient 
suffers from an eating disorder? In quantum theory, the mental state vector has to identify 
with the judgment outcome, so the new mental state vector has to be a normalized vector 
along the disorder ray, denoted as 𝜓′. This is a very constrained prediction for what happens 
to the mental state following a judgment (and concerns a fundamental theorem in quantum 
theory). For example, outside quantum theory, there is no reason why the judgment could not 
produce a mental state that is halfway between the judgment outcome and the original state 
(e.g., the green state vector Z in Figure 1 is not allowed) or indeed leave the original mental 
state unaffected. This is what motivates the use of quantum theory in the present work. 
Quantum theory could describe fairly naturally previous demonstrations of the evaluation bias 
(White et al., 2014, 2015, 2020).  
 We briefly introduce two more elements of quantum theory. First, belief updating can 
be represented by rotating the state vector. For example, suppose that the clinician receives 
some evidence that the patient is healthy. Then, the clinician’s mental state vector is changed 
by rotating it towards the healthy subspace (to 𝜓′). Second, given some evidence, the clinician 
might think the patient is healthy, but respond that she has an eating disorder. That is, there 
may be a mismatch between the judgment outcome and the change in mental state. In 
quantum theory, there are technical tools which allow noise in projection.  
 Putting everything together, in the present work we examine evidence for constructive 
influences (evaluation biases) in clinical judgment (concerning eating disorders). This is an 
interesting application, because of the high expectations for rational judgment in clinical 
diagnosis and because of the apparent complexity of such judgments. We focus our rational 
analysis on a specific issue: by applying quantum models to the results, we can examine 
evidence of constructive processes in our participants’ judgments. But it should be clear that 
in this case such constructive processes are not rational. In the case of a clinician evaluating a 
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patient, if the clinician makes an intermediate judgment, this has no impact on the 
probabilities that the patient is actually suffering from an eating disorder or not. In such a 
case, an evaluation bias is irrational. The application of quantum theory can then inform 
whether such a clinician mistakenly adopts quantum processes when this is not appropriate vs. 
whether he/she employs some heuristic or bias outside quantum (or Bayesian) theory. The 
latter possibility is taken into account by applying a plausible heuristics model, the belief 
adjustment model (Hogarth & Einhorn 1992). Arguably, this informs the extent of 
irrationality (or noise; or maybe our inability to describe these results) in the clinician’s 
judgment, but we defer further discussion for later.  
 
 
Figure 1. The mental state of a clinician initially thinking that a patient is likely to have an 
eating disorder is 𝜓. Following a judgment, if the clinician indeed decides that there is a 
disorder, the mental state has to become 𝜓′, according to quantum theory; alternatives, such 
as Z, are not allowed. Finally, the presentation of some evidence that the patient is healthy 
(without a judgment) requires a rotation of the mental state towards the healthy subspace.  
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 Three groups of participants took part in the experiment: 37 clinical psychologists (33 
women, aged between 28 and 58 years, M=41.97; SD=7.23; with professional experience 
from two to 34 years, M=17.24; SD=6.81); 36 psychiatrists (29 women; aged between 30 and 
59 years, M=42.28; SD=7.42; with professional experience raging from five to 34 years, 
M=15.86; SD = 7.41) and 33 participants without clinical background, students of psychology 
(29 women, aged between 21 and 40 years M=23.45; SD=3.49; their non-clinical professional 
experience ranged from zero to 14 years M=.82, SD=3.23). Participants were recruited in 
Poland. One of us (BI) used her professional network to identify participants willing to take 
part in the study and sample sizes were opportunistic (we recruited as many participants in the 
first two categories as was practical; the sample size for the students was then matched to the 
first two). Note, it is possible that this limits generalizability of the present results. 
Participants were informed that the aim of the research was to explore clinical decision 
making and the distinctive characteristics of psychiatrists, psychologists and students, for 
judgments relating to eating disorders. Participants received no compensation for taking part 
in the research. Ethics approval was granted by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Pedagogics and Psychology of the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland. 
 
 2.2 Design 
The dependent variable corresponded to the probability of disorder for the second piece of 
information, out of the two pieces of information which comprised each hypothetical patient 
case. There were three main factors. First, whether the first piece of information was rated or 
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not (single vs. double). Second, the valences of the two pieces of information in each patient 
case in the order processed by the participants (ordering condition, with four levels: health-
health, disorder-disorder, health-disorder, and disorder-health). Finally, the rater profession 
(student, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist).  
  
 2.3 Materials 
 
 Between 2007-2014 a study was conducted on a population of 121 females with eating 
disorders (clinical group) and 92 healthy women (control group); the two groups were 
matched for age (Izydorczyk, 2011b). Participants in the clinical group suffered from a variety 
of eating disorders, including anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, or binge eating disorder. 
Both the clinical and the control groups were comprised of females of similar age, namely 
early adulthood. Selection criteria for this earlier study were the presence (clinical group) or 
absence (control) of an eating disorder, as demonstrated by pre-existing medical diagnosis 
(based on the International Classification of Disorders, ICD, issued by the World Health 
Organization): anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa (F50) or a binge eating disorder (ICD10 
F50.4). The individuals in the clinical group were being treated in Polish centers for eating 
disorders.  
 Out of the 213 participant cases as above, we first selected 36 cases aiming for an 
approximate balance between healthy and disordered cases. We then assessed whether 
corresponding case summaries correctly revealed the health or disorder of the patient. This 
was established by having four independent, competent raters – two experienced clinical 
psychologists and two psychiatrists experienced in diagnosis and treatment of eating disorders 
– examine each summary and determine whether it led to a conclusion of patient health or 
eating disorder. Only clinical case summaries of confirmed valence during this preliminary 
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stage, for which Kendall’s concordance coefficient was over .70, were used in the main 
experiment. The above criteria allowed us to identify eight case summaries, each consisting of 
two parts: two cases in which both halves indicated eating disorders, two cases in which both 
halves indicated patient health, and four cases in which one half indicated health and the other 
eating disorder. Descriptions of the patients and their behavior in the “disorder” parts included 
symptoms of various eating disorders, whereas in the “healthy” parts neutral biographical data 




 Participants received eight clinical case summaries, each composed of two parts. They 
could choose where and when to complete the task. Participants were instructed to read the 
descriptions carefully and to assign a probability that the patient is suffering from an eating 
disorder on a 10-point scale, with anchors: 1 - definitely healthy (does not suffer from eating 
disorders), to 10 - definitely disordered (suffers from an eating disorder). For each case, 
participants either rated the probability of the patient’s disorder after reading the first and then 
after reading the second part of the summary (a rating for the first part, followed by a rating 
for both parts; double rating condition) or they provided a single rating for both parts (single 
rating condition; Figure 2). Presentation order of the two parts in each case was sometimes 
reversed between participants, so that for the same patient, some participants were shown the 
relevant information in one order and other participants in the reverse order. Note, there is no 
guarantee that participants would process the relevant information in the intended sequential 
way and some participants might go back to the first part, after having read the second part. 
Such flexibility in assessing the relevant information is closer to clinical practice. 
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Figure 2. The main parts of the procedure.  
3. Results 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the results averaged across rater professions. The vertical axis indicates 
degree of disorder rescaled onto a [0,1] range.   
Participants read the second half of the summary of the clinical case (part B) 
What is the probability that the patient 
suffers from eating disorders?
What is the probability that the patient 
suffers from eating disorders?
Participants read the first half of the summary of the clinical case (part A) 
no rating
What is the probability that the patient 
suffers from eating disorders?
Single conjunctive rating condition
(part A & part B)
Double rating condition
(first part A and then part B)
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Table 1. Comparison of the ratings from the pilot study with ratings in the experiment, for the 
eight cases which were eventually selected.  
     Part A   
  mean/ SD  mean/ SD  Bayes factor  
Alicja  1/ 0   1.96/ 1.2  1.04 
Anna  8.75/ 0.96  9.1/ 1.11  2.05 
Celina  1/ 0   2.22/ 1.54  1.02 
Joanna  2.5/ 1.73  3.83/ 2.43  1.58 
Malgorzata 2/ 0.82   2.92/ 1.85  1.7 
Maria  1.75/ 0.96  2.7/ 1.54  1.42 
Marta  2/ 0.82   3.24/ 2.11  1.49 
Oliwia  9.5/ 1   9.22/ 1.13  2.16 
 
     Part B   
  mean/ SD  mean/ SD  Bayes factor  
Alicja  1/ 0   2.18/ 1.68  1.22 
Anna  8.25/ 2.87  9.35/ 1.25  1.18 
Celina  1/ 0   2.25/ 1.67  1.14 
Joanna  9.5/ 0.58  9.24/ 0.79  2.03 
Malgorzata 6.5/ 3.7  6.56/ 2.81  2.33 
Maria  9.5/ 1   8.84/ 1.32  1.7 
Marta  7.75/ 0.96  7.73/ 1.99  2.33 
Oliwia  8.5/ 1.73  7.56/ 2.02  1.76 
 
Note. The ‘Pilot’ column indicates ratings in the pilot study (N=4) and the ‘Experiment’ 
column ratings in the main experiment (N=848, corresponding to separate judgments). Each 
case is labeled by the name of a hypothetical person in the case.  
 
 We first considered the valence of the various pieces of information in the case 
summaries, by comparing the ratings for each part with the ratings of the four expert raters 
who were employed in the design stage of the study. It can be seen in Table 1 that there is 
high consistency between the preliminary ratings and averages from the main experiment 
(inferential tests are only indicative because of the small sample sizes). That is, case parts 
assumed to reflect eating disorders vs. health were perceived so by participants in the main 
experiment.  
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 The main purpose of the behavioral analyses is to examine whether there is an 
evaluation bias and whether this depends on the profession (and so relevant expertise) of the 
participants. In the health—disorder condition, the second part indicates disorder; we 
therefore expect mean ratings in the double rating condition to be higher than in the single 
rating one (recalling that the dependent variable corresponds to degree of disorder). In the 
disorder—health condition, the second part indicates health, and so the evaluation bias 
prediction is that the mean in the double rating condition would be lower (indicating a 
stronger rating for health) than in the single rating one. The two health—health and 
disorder—disorder conditions were control ones, for which we assume equality in the mean 
rating for the first and second parts. Figure 3 shows the overall results, that is, mean disorder 
ratings, depending on different combinations of health and disorder for the two parts.  
 We ran a mixed effects model (multilevel linear model in SPSS with both random and 
fixed effects) with the probability of disorder for the second part (which we will abbreviate as 
Prob(disorder, second part)) as the dependent variable, three fixed effects, and two random 
effects. The fixed effects were whether there were judgments just on the second part vs. on 
both parts vs. (single vs. double), whether the parts were ordered according to health—health, 
disorder – disorder, health—disorder, disorder – health (ordering condition), and the rater 
profession (psychologist, psychiatrist, or student). The random effects corresponded to the 
hypothetical patient cases (case) and the participant. The dependent variable was rescaled 
onto the [0, 1] range, to resemble probabilities for disorder for the judgment following the 
second part, but we treated the variable as unbounded (that is, not restricted to the [0, 1] 
range).  
 Detailed results are shown in Appendix 2. The best model for Prob(disorder, second 
part) included the fixed effects and their two-way interactions and the random effects were 
modeled with both intercepts and slopes for the ordering condition (diagonal covariance 
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matrix). The two-way interaction between the single vs. double and ordering fixed effects was 
significant (F(3,848)=36.9, p<.0005), which is a prerequisite condition for the evaluation bias. 
The lack of three-way interaction involving rater profession precludes the possibility that the 
evaluation bias depends on this factor.  
 Further analyses are needed to establish whether the two-way interaction between 
single vs. double and the ordering condition reflects an evaluation bias. We next ran separate 
mixed effects models for each ordering condition, with fixed effects rater profession, single 
vs. double, and the interaction between the two variables; random effects (case, participant) 
were modelled only with intercepts. These separate models test the differences in 
Prob(disorder, second part) between single vs. double conditions, for each of the four groups 
in Figure 3. For the health—disorder, disorder—health, health—health, and disorder—
disorder, we observed respectively F(1, 227)=.07, p=ns; F(1, 197)=72.8, p<.0005; F(1, 
211)=.99, p=ns; F(1, 213)=2.92, p=.09.  
 To conclude, regarding the evaluation bias, results indicate a difference consistent 
with expectation in the disorder—health case, but not the health—disorder one. We can 
provisionally suggest that there is enough evidence for constructive effects to examine them 
with formal models. Note, it is puzzling that there is a trend for non-equality in the disorder—
disorder case. The lack of interaction effects with rater profession also undermines the 
expectation that more experienced professionals might be less susceptible to this judgment 
bias in their diagnosis.  
 
4. Modeling examination   
 The partial evidence for an evaluation bias suggests that judgments were influenced by 
constructive influences in the eating disorders diagnostic task. This motivates fitting White et 
al.’s (2014, 2020) quantum model. The main characteristic of this model is that a judgment 
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entails the change of the mental state in a specific way (Figure 1). However, the complexity of 
clinical judgments makes it likely that representations and processes focused just on the 
presence or not of eating disorders do not capture all relevant behavior. Therefore, it is 
possible that a quantum constructive influence is relevant, but the basic quantum processes in 
White et al.’s (2014, 2020) model only offer a noisy approximation to behavior. In a quantum 
framework, one way to introduce noise is as a mismatch between a judgment outcome and the 
change in the mental state, and this is the approach we pursue. A final, reasonable possibility 
is that there is a constructive influence, but this influence is different from the one assumed in 
quantum theory. This possibility is captured well by Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief 
adjustment model.  
 We introduce the notation FSDR (first stimulus, double rating condition) = the 
probability that the person in a case study suffers from an eating disorder, after the first piece 
of information in the double rating condition; SSDR (second stimulus, double rating 
condition) = likewise, but after the second piece of information in the double rating condition; 
and SSSR (second stimulus, single rating condition) = likewise, but after the second piece of 
information in the single rating condition.   
 The basic quantum model for the evaluation bias is presented in detail in White et al. 
(2020) and we summarize its key components here. We assume a two-dimensional subspace, 
with one-dimensional subspaces for (eating) disorder vs. health. Consider the disorder-health 
case. A participant would first be exposed to information indicating disorder, so the initial 
mental state vector, 𝜓, is placed near the subspace for disorder (Figure 3). The angle between 
𝜓 and the disorder ray is labeled as rating. Introducing the health information results in a 
rotation, angle n, towards the health ray. In the single rating condition, the new mental state is 
𝜓𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒. In the double rating condition, after the initial disorder information, the judgment 
should first result in a projection of the state vector along the disorder ray. Then, introducing 
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the health information would rotate the state vector along angle n, giving us mental state 
𝜓𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒. In both cases, we compute the probability of health by projecting along the healthy 
ray, and it can be seen that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 𝜓𝑑𝑜𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑒) >  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 𝜓𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒), which is the 
evaluation bias (Appendix 3 offers the equations). The parameters of the quantum model are 
rating and n (both angles in an unrestricted range).  
 The noisy quantum model is specified analogously, but for an assumption of noise in 
the projection process, so that there is a probability, 𝜖, that the judgment outcome is, e.g., 
disorder, but the mental state changes to align with health. The motivation for this elaboration 
is that we are trying to model a complex clinical judgment, using simple representations (one-
dimensional subspaces) and simple dynamical processes. Therefore, noise is one way to 
represent the lack of correspondence between model assumptions and behavioral processes. 
The noisy quantum model is a novel proposal, not previously explored. The representations in 
the noisy quantum model are set up in a way analogous to that for the basic quantum model 
and the parameters rating and n are still in place. Additionally, there is a third noise parameter 
(𝜖, [0,1] range).  
 Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) model is included in the present comparison because it 
offers an alternative perspective of constructive influences and the evaluation bias compared 
to the quantum models. We adopted White et al.’s (2020) formulation, who also applied the 
model to evaluation bias data (in Appendix 3 we summarize the equations). The model 
assumes an initial belief state. When the evaluation of the available information is SbS, the 
belief state is updated after each piece of evidence, in a way that reflects a compromise 
between the current state and the presented evidence. In the EoS case, there is a single 
revision in the belief state, once all evidence has been presented. In both cases, a change in 
the belief state can be interpreted as a constructive influence. However, the nature of the 
constructive influence is more flexible than in the case of the quantum models. Even adopting 
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several restrictions to the belief adjustment model (to make it possible to apply it to the 
present data, see Appendix 3), the change in the belief state is parametrically determined. The 
model has two parameters analogous to those of the basic quantum model.  
 As noted, regarding rationality, a constructive influence in the case of eating disorder 
diagnosis would be irrational either way. So, the question we are addressing by fitting the 
three models is whether participants are adopting an approach which could be rational (even if 
it is not in the present case; cf. the anxious teenager discussion) or one that has no obvious 
rational justification.  
We conducted fits separately for data points conforming to disorder-health vs. points 
conforming to health-disorder, based on whether the first judgment was more consistent with 
an impression of disorder vs. health. The details of how the models were fitted are shown in 
Appendix 4. The essential point is that the data comprised of 12 triplets of SSSR, FSDR, and 
SSDR judgments (one for each patient case) and each model had two main parameters, with 
the noisy quantum model having an additional noise parameter. For each triplet separately, we 
used the SSSR and FSDR judgments to determine the two model parameters. Given these 
parameters, each model produces a prediction for SSDR. Applying the models in this way 
meant that we examined whether they predicted correctly the degree of constructive influence 
in each of the 12 cases. Model fit was assessed in terms of the closeness of correspondence 
between model predictions and observed data for the 12 SSDR judgments.  
Table 2 shows the summary fit statistics, corresponding to Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) values. BIC is a fit statistic penalizing for model complexity; lower values 
indicate better fit. Note that differences in BIC between 2 and 6 constitute ‘positive’ evidence 
for the model with the lower BIC value against the one with the higher BIC value (e.g., Kass 
& Raftery, 1995). Table 3 presents the 12 SSDR datapoints against which model performance 
was assessed. In the disorder-health case, it looks like all three models were unable to produce 
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constructive influences as large as those which were observed. In the health-disorder case, the 
noisy quantum model produced good fit, but the other two models produced constructive 
influences different to those which were observed.  
 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of the basic quantum approach (see text for explanation). The thick 
line along the healthy ray is a measure of the evaluation bias.  
 
Table 2. BIC values for the three models.  
   BIC value for disorder-health BIC value for health-disorder 
Model  
basic quantum   -16.56     -19.76 
noisy quantum  -13.22 (𝜖 = 0.49)   -28.31 (𝜖 = 0.1) 
belief adjustment  -14     -22.60 
Note. BIC statistics for the three models examined in this work.  
 
Table 3. Correspondence between observed and predicted FSDR values, for the basic 
quantum model, the noisy quantum model, and the belief adjustment model.  
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Condition Observed SSDR   Predicted FSDR 
     basic quantum  noisy quantum  belief adjust. 
Oliwia DD  .83   .47  .66  .88 
Anna DD  .94   1  .72  .93 
Marta DH  .26   .08  .61  .62 
Malgorzata DH  .24   .21  .62  .68 
Maria DH  .26   .27  .62  .69 
Joanna DH  .42   .88  .6  .70 
Celina HH  .07   0  .10  .03 
Alicja HH  .06   0  .11  .06 
Marta HD  .76   .99  .80  .82 
Malgorzata HD  .6   .99  .77  .83 
Maria HD  .9   1  .89  .84 
Joanna HD  .93   .97  .87  .65 
Note. Case names can be referenced against the materials in Appendix 1. The shaded cases 
corresponded to the disorder-health datapoints (see main text) and the unshared ones to the 
health-disorder ones. DD, HH, DH, and HD refer respectively to disorder-disorder, health-
health, disorder-health, and health-disorder.  
 
5. Discussion – in search of rationality  
 It is worth highlighting that understanding the present judgments was not expected to 
be straightforward. Each stimulus was a description of a patient case, which was realistic, 
fairly extensive, and with many unique characteristics. Participants included highly 
experienced professionals with relevant clinical or psychiatric experience. Attempting to 
understand such judgments with simple models, embodying no more than three parameters, 
has been ambitious and goes beyond the more standard, highly controlled experimental 
paradigms in cognitive science. Indeed, we would have weak expectations concerning the 
generalizability of the empirical data, beyond the conclusion that clinical judgements of this 
kind can show evaluation biases, as the empirical analyses and model fits showed. Regarding 
the latter, by setting model parameters using part of the data and examining model predictions 
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for the rest, we believe we have more direct tests of the key assumptions of the models, that 
beliefs appear to change when there is a judgment after the first piece of information.  
 Is there evidence that participants behave rationally in the present tasks? Constructive 
influences specifically consistent with the quantum model would be rational, under certain 
circumstances, because of the normative justification for quantum theory (Pothos et al., 2017; 
i.e., a constructive influence inconsistent with quantum theory would not have this rational 
justification). So, if participants are following quantum principles in their behavior, 
concerning constructive influences, they are in principle following rational principles (there 
was good fit for the noisy quantum model, at least in the health-disorder condition). However, 
quantum theory provides rational prescription only when it matches well the situation at hand. 
Concerning constructive influences, it would be rational to follow quantum principles, only 
when the system which is the focus of probabilistic inference is subject to constructive 
influences (perhaps there is disturbance from measurement). In this case, this is not so! That 
is, there is a mismatch between constructive influences in the minds of the participants (the 
empirical evidence shows such influences) and the world (where there is no mechanism for 
constructive influences to occur). Therefore, it looks like participants are sometimes applying 
the rational principles from quantum theory concerning constructive influences, when this is 
not warranted by the world.  
 Regarding the disorder-health condition no model produced superior fits, so it is may 
be that participants followed quantum principles (albeit imperfectly) or it may be that they 
adopted more idiosyncratic heuristics. The heuristics model we adopted was the belief 
adjustment model. It is hard to see how the assumption of a belief adjustment process can be 
justified in rational terms, without some argument concerning the adaptive value of such 
principles. However, it is doubtful that the belief adjustment model (as presently applied) 
could capture all heuristic influences in the present results. Recall, we observed a small, not 
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statistically reliable evaluation bias in the health-disorder condition and a strong evaluation 
bias in the disorder-health condition. So, if the initial information indicated health, whether a 
judgment was made or not seemed to have little effect. However, if the initial information 
indicated disorder, making an initial judgment vs. not would have a (more) major impact on 
the subsequent judgment based on information indicating health. A possible explanation is 
that clinically oriented participants might be anxious about providing a false disorder 
diagnosis.  
 With these points in mind, we can ask what we learned from the present work. 
Theoretically, the quantum models formalize the idea that constructive influences in 
judgments can be rational, e.g., when a judgment disturbs the relevant system in a certain 
way. Quantum theory formalizes the way we can describe this disturbance and how a sense of 
rational inference can emerge from judgments which appear, classically, erroneous. This 
argument hinges on the consistency of quantum theory with particular requirements for 
normative probabilistic inference (Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, & Yearsley, 2017).  
 Empirically, it is clear that neither the quantum model nor the belief adjustment model 
offer fully satisfactory fits to the data. This is a significant conclusion, because both models 
are constructed on the basis of reasonable processes (given our overall understanding of 
decision making) and both models have previously received considerable support. It is 
possible that suitable revisions to the models might accommodate the data or that the data 
reflects strategies too idiosyncratic to the particular sample (psychologists and psychiatrists in 
a particular nation) for description with general principles. Without further empirical work, it 
would be premature to further revise the models. Either way, the conclusions concerning the 
models and the specific empirical patterns should be considered particular to the specific 
population we targeted and not necessarily generalizable to the general population (Simons et 
al., 2017).  
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 Methodologically, it may seem unsatisfactory that model tests were carried out on 12 
data points. The reason for this is that a within participants approach would have required 
each participant to conduct both single rating and double rating judgments (Appendix 4). This 
would introduce task demands, since experienced clinicians would be unlikely to offer 
differing judgments for the same cases across the two conditions. Therefore, we had to focus 
on a within items approach, whereby we were limited by the number of suitable patient cases 
we could identify and the time it would take for participants to go through multiple cases. 
However, we contend that these limitations are not severe. Averaged data across participants 
are sometimes used to test decision models (e.g., this is how models for prisoner’s dilemma 
are often tested, e.g., Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009) and one advantage of employing averaged 
data is that they offer insight onto response biases (fairly) independently of idiosyncratic 
strategies.   
 This work allows some recommendations for how to further study the rationality of 
behavior in realistic, clinical situations. There is some evidence that participants might be 
misapplying rational principles concerning constructive influences. Is this because, in their 
experience, there are situations when such rational principles would be appropriate? It would 
be interesting to extend the present paradigm when the clinician’s judgment can change the 
relevant system. For example, consider clinical judgments concerning e.g. anxiety or 
depression, offered directly to participants. An anxious participant being told that some 
information about his/her profile indicates anxiety might plausibly affect the participant’s 
anxiety levels (thus altering or disturbing the ‘system’). Clearly, it would not be possible to 
conduct such a study in the laboratory, but maybe relevant data can be obtained through the 
observation of practicing clinicians.  
 It is also unsurprising that there is room to elaborate the modeling approaches. Within 
a quantum framework, an asymmetry between the health-disorder and the disorder-health 
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conditions can naturally arise if we postulate that the concept (and so subspace) for health is 
larger than for disorder, in the sense that there are more ways in which a person can be 
healthy than suffering from a specific disorder (Pothos, Busemeyer, & Trueblood, 2013). But 
it is unclear whether this would suffice to accommodate the very large constructive influence 
in the disorder-health condition. More generally, there are several promising possibilities, and 
we outline some of them below, based on recent work with Bayesian theory and the adaptive 
toolbox.  
A probabilistic language of thought approach follows the general principles of 
hierarchical Bayesian modelling, according to which when we encounter a stimulus we infer 
some information both about the stimulus and the broader category the stimulus belongs to (a 
hypothesis and an over-hypothesis; Kemp et al., 2007). So, in the e.g. disorder-health 
direction, when encountering the first stimulus, a participant first infers that the clinical case 
indicates disorder. Then, the subsequent health information is evaluated from the point of 
view of a probability distribution for disorder information. The more narrow this distribution 
about disorder, the more extreme the subsequent impression regarding health. Under what 
circumstances would we expect a narrow, specific distribution for disorder information from 
the first stimulus? An overarching assumption in communication and pragmatics is that, in 
general, speakers are helpful (Goodman & Frank, 2016). So, from a participant’s point of 
view, the request to rate vs. not rate the first piece of information may create a covert bias to 
process this information in a deeper vs. more superficial way. Overall, this picture can 
accommodate a prediction of judgments indicating more disorder, when the first disorder 
information is rated, because the resulting distribution would be sharper and less noisy. 
According to the adaptive toolbox framework, one of the key tenets of rational 
behavior is that an available heuristic is chosen to match the properties of the task and 
environment at hand (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001). A fast-and-frugal heuristic that ignores 
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information, or integrates information in a simpler fashion, often performs better than a 
complex model by trading off more bias with less variance (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). 
This is particularly advantageous for small and/or uncertain data samples—in such a case, 
heuristics can outperform complex models (the less-is-more effect, Gigerenzer et al, 1999). 
Consequently, the appropriate heuristic to choose from the adaptive toolbox depends on 
properties of the information set. A decision maker called upon to provide a rating only after 
viewing the whole informational sequence may use a different heuristic than when providing 
two separate ratings after each part. Furthermore, the temporal order and partitioning of 
information may signal the relative importance or validity of the information. Such a picture 
could explain a dependence of judgments on the exact presentation characteristics of the 
stimuli. Note, the adaptive heuristics toolbox may appear to present a view of rationality 
distinct from that of Bayesian theory or quantum theory, but in both cases there have been 
discussions attempting to converge the different frameworks (for the former see Lieder & 
Griffiths, 2019; for the latter see Kvam & Pleskac, 2017).  
Finally, from the perspective of resource-rational analysis (Icard & Goodman, 2005), 
people may neglect the first stimulus unless the task makes it worthwhile to consider it. When 
the previous stimulus was not rated, then people use the simplest possible causal model that 
includes only two variables: the second stimulus (cause) and their current experience (effect). 
But when people previously rated the first stimulus, then their causal model includes three 
variables: the first stimulus (cause 1), the second stimulus (cause 2), and their current 
experience (effect). This might be resource-rational because when people have not rated the 
first stimulus, incorporating its effect into the judgment for the second one would require 
more effort. As a consequence, the contrast between the first and second stimulus becomes 
more pronounced when people rate the first stimulus. Moreover, the model of utility-weighted 
learning (Lieder, Griffiths, & Hsu, 2018) offers a perspective on why the evaluation bias 
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appears for disorder-health stimuli, but not for health-disorder ones. According to the model, 
extreme events come to mind more readily than neutral events because 1) they are more 
important to consider, and 2) it is more valuable to consolidate their memories. This line of 
reasoning suggests that, in contrast to the emotionally salient information about the disease, 
the initial information about health does not contaminate the subsequent judgment because it 
is not important enough to warrant further attention. 
All these perspectives could reveal, to varying degrees, rational facets of the 
evaluation bias. However, equally, some of these theoretical elaborations require higher 
model parameterizations and so more complex experimental paradigms. A tension between 
the simplicity of the experimental paradigm (and so the intuitive compellingness of an 
empirical result) and the sufficiency of the dataset to discern subtle modeling assumptions is 
hardly new, of course, and one of the most central challenges in developing our understanding 
of rationality in human behavior. We hope the present results provide enough groundwork for 
the further elaboration of the paradigm and relevant theory, with a view to provide a more 
accurate evaluation of the rational status of constructive influences.  
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Appendix 1 
 Additional information regarding the eight cases of individuals with or without eating 
disorders employed in the experiment.  
 We provide summaries of the clinical case descriptions used in the study, arranged so 
that the first column indicates part A and the second part B. Recall that during the experiment 
the order of sequential presentation for the two parts was counterbalanced. The Health and 
Disordered characterizations after each story concern just eating disorders, as relevant to the 
design of the study.  
Patient’s 
name 
Part 1 of the description Part 2 of the description 






Alicja searched for professional support 
because she has been experiencing fear of 
sudden death or illness, loss of job and social 
anxieties, especially in situations related to 
professional work. Alicja reported lack of 
satisfaction with her life (also at work), the 
presence of a depressed mood and negative 
thinking about herself. Lately she had been 
suffering from sadness, anxiety, 
dissatisfaction, feelings of loneliness and 
helplessness, as well as pessimism. Alicja also 
complained about memory losses and attention 
deficits. 
Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
107 words) 
Alice describes herself as an ambitious, 
sociable person, but also presents submission 
and excessive dependence on the approval of 
the others. She experiences fear of risk, 
hypersensitivity to criticism and poor control of 
expression of the emotions, constant feelings of 
inferiority. While describing social 
relationships from childhood to adulthood 
(including the work environment) one gets an 
impression of low self – esteem and difficulties 
with building relations. 







Anna does not have internal motivation to start 
the treatment. During the consultation she 
denies the significance of weight loss noticed 
by her parents. At the time of admittance Anna 
weighs 47 kg and is 167 cm tall. She has not 
menstruated for several months. Due to cardiac 
arrhythmias she has been seen by a 
cardiologist. Anna's mother observed 
persistent restrictive slimming and physical 
exercise, avoiding meals with the family and 
visible weight loss. s (Disordered, Polish 
version used in the study had 292 words)  
Anna undertakes  restrictive slimming 
(including fasting) and intense physical 
exercise. Anna is afraid of weight gain, controls 
meals, and is alienated from her peers. Anna 
likes her current body shape, but can't imagine 
getting fat. She has increasingly reacted with 
anger at attempts to make her increase the 
amount of food consumed every day. She feels 
fat and unattractive. In addition to the growing 
dysphoric mood in adolescence she 
demonstrates emotional instability, 
perfectionism and desire for full control. 
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 
had 344 words) 






Celina seeks clinical help for the first time in 
her life because of a condition she has been 
feeling for several months described as a 
"severe nervous breakdown." When asked 
what this means, she answers: "I can't sleep, I 
have nightmares, I'm afraid, I don't want 
anything, I have felt bad all the time, I don't feel 
good, my partner wanted me to leave, so I 
moved out".  
(Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
128 words) 
When Celina went to study away from her 
home town, she experienced anxiety. For 
several months she has also reported a feeling 
of being overwhelmed by negative thoughts, 
apathy and aversion to everyday activities, 
including professional activities. Till now 
Celina has not been hospitalized. 









Joanna searches for medical help for the first 
time in her life, saying that “she is under stress 
and has trouble eating and no appetite” because 
of recent death of her grandmother. She has had 
problems eating food for the last 6 months, she 
describes it as" growing food in my mouth ". 
The results of medical tests did not confirm 
presence of gastrointestinal diseases or other 
somatic diseases. Joanna reports weakness, 
apathy and frequent trouble falling asleep since 
her grandmother died. The onset of these 
symptoms appeared six months ago. 
(Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
205 words) 
Joanna admits she eats a lot during the day and 
then uses various laxatives to get rid of food 
because she is afraid to gain weight. She also 
gets up at nights to eat something. She 
describes own body as "monstrous, ugly, 
sagging". Joanna is afraid to gain weight, she 
tries to exercise every day, but she can't be 
consistent She has been controlling calories for 
some time; she is often hungry, but she also eats 
more often. Initially she would eat 1500 
calories, now she limits food to 600 calories or 
"throws herself on every food in the fridge" and 
eats everything she can find. Joanna weighed 
60 kg. and had a height of 165 cm. (Disordered, 
Polish version used in the study had 338 words) 









After breaking up with a partner, Malgorzata 
experiences "nervous breakdown, sadness, 
depression (…) I couldn't get out of bed, the 
world collapsed". Since then, she has lost the 
appetite and is unwilling to eat anything. She 
has alienated herself from her college 
environment, stopped  contact with her friends, 
but has been attending classes and passing her 
exams. Marta has always been a perfect 
exemplary student. 
(Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
187 words) 
She has difficulties eating and notices weight 
loss. For several years, she has been consulted 
by doctors because of recurring fainting, mood 
changes, anxiety, and apathy. Malgorzata 
weights 57 kg with a height of 170 cm. She is 
unhappy with her appearance. Marta has been 
using a variety of diets and is  intensely 
exercising at the. She often feels frustrated, sad, 
and complains about mood swings. She 
occasionally reaches for amphetamines. 
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 






She visits a doctor due to stomach aches and 
diarrhea getting worse, especially during 
stressful exam sessions.  Medical tests do not 
confirm the presence of gastrointestinal or 
other somatic diseases. At the time of going to 
the doctor, she reported a weight loss of 5 kilos 
over the last two months, an increase in apathy, 
unwillingness to act, and problems with 
professional activity, which are associated with 
frequent periods of depressed mood. 
(Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
221 words) 
After losing 7 kilograms she noticed a change 
in the appearance, began limiting food (ate less, 
introduced reduction of fats, carbohydrates and 
other nutrients, and started counting calories). 
She is unhappy with her body, often feels fat 
and unattractive, and has low self-esteem. She 
often experiences headaches, fatigue and has 
trouble concentrating. She exercises intensively 
every dayShe is on ses a diet of no more than 
1000 calories per day.  
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 
had 274 words) 






Marta attends medical studies in a city located 
a few hundred kilometers from her family 
home. Since the beginning of the academic 
year she has been experiencing lack of appetite 
and unwillingness to eat anything. Marta 
alienates from her college environment, breaks 
her contacts with her friend, but attends classes 
and passes her exams. Marta has always been 
an exemplary student. 
(Healthy, Polish version used in the study had 
177 words) 
In an interview with a psychiatrist, she says that 
she has difficulties eating and noticed weight 
loss. She has been consulted by doctors several 
times because of recurring fainting, anxiety and 
apathy. She weights 57 kilograms and is 170 
cm tall. She has not menstruated for months. 
She is unhappy with her appearance, keeps 
controlling the calories, and weighs herself 
daily. As a teenager, she had followed diets and 
regularly exercised at the gym. 
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 






Olivia can't cope with herself, stress and binge 
eating. She says that she can't think and focus 
on anything except for food. She reaches for 
food even when she doesn't feel hungry. Twice 
a day she vomits after meals, but she is not 
using laxatives. Medical tests did not show any 
malfunctions of the digestive system or other 
somatic disorders. Sometimes she practices 
fasting and exercise.  
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 
had 400 words) 
Olivia had been on medication for two years 
due to periodically increasing mood swings and 
periods of severe depression. She also admits to 
acts of verbal aggression. In addition to the 
growing dysphoric mood in adolescence, 
Olivia has observed a pattern of emotionally-
based responses and a tendency for 
compulsiveness and emotional instability. She 
does not accept own appearance. 
(Disordered, Polish version used in the study 
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Appendix 2 
We first consider the mixed effects models, which were run to establish the presence of an 
evaluation bias. To briefly review the structure of the models, we employed three fixed 
effects, and two random effects. The fixed effects were whether there were judgments on both 
parts vs. on a single part (single vs. double), whether the parts were ordered according to 
health—health, disorder – disorder, health—disorder, disorder – health (ordering condition), 
and the rater profession (psychologist, psychiatrist, or student). The random effects 
corresponded to the hypothetical patient case (case) and the participant. The analyses 
employed a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method. Model fits are expressed by 
minus twice log likelihoods (-2LL) and nested models are compared using chi squared 
distributions for the difference in model fits, with degrees of freedom corresponding to the 
difference in model parameters. The significance level is taken to be .05. 
 As is typical in mixed effects analyses, a series of nested models has to be run in order 
to establish, first, which interaction terms can be retained and, second, whether random effects 
have to be modeled with just intercepts or with intercepts and slopes and the structure of the 
covariance matrix (if slopes are employed). Clearly, situations which would be fairly 
straightforward in the case of traditional ANOVA designs can entail a large number of 
possibilities/ models in mixed effects designs. We proceeded in a standard way closely 
following the recommendations of Field (2017).  
 As noted, we first consider which interaction terms can be retained. For the models 
with only main effects, two-way interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term we 
observed respectively -2LL values and parameters of -67.6, 9; -184.6, 20; and -186.9, 26 
(lower -2LL values indicate better fit). The model with two-way interactions is clearly 
superior to the model with just main effects, 𝜒2(11) = 117, p<.0005, but the model with a 
three-way interaction did not constitute a significant improvement, 𝜒2(6) = 2.3, p=ns. This 
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first part of the analyses allows us to reach two conclusions. First, rater profession does not 
interact with the presence or not of the evaluation bias. The evaluation bias requires an 
interaction between the single vs. double factor and the ordering factor. So, if the rater 
profession impacted on the evaluation bias, then this would require a corresponding three-way 
interaction. As this was not observed, we can dismiss the rater profession factor. Second, the 
model with two-way interactions showed the crucial single vs. double, ordering condition 
interaction to be significant (F(3,848)=36.9, p<.0005), thus offering preliminary evidence for 
an evaluation bias of some kind (full evidence for an evaluation bias is not possible unless the 
interaction is examined more carefully).  
   Subsequent analyses include all main fixed effects and their two-way interactions (-
2LL and parameters: -184.6, 20). We then considered whether the modelling of the random 
effect could benefit from slopes for both the ordering condition and the rater profession fixed 
effects (it is less meaningful to employ slopes for the single vs. double fixed effect too). We 
initially restricted the covariance matrix to the simplest possible option of variance 
components. The models with slopes for just the ordering condition, just the rater profession, 
and for both fixed effects had -2LL values and parameters as, respectively, -184.6, 21; -184.6, 
21; -184.6, 22. It is immediately clear that these models do not offer an improvement 
compared to the model with intercepts only for the random effect. However, it is possible that 
the variance components covariance matrix fits the present data poorly. We therefore repeated 
these analyses with diagonal covariance matrices, observing -353.2, 24; -191.0, 23; -344.2, 
27, and with unstructured covariance matrices, observing -319.1, 34; -191.0, 29; -263.2, 55. 
Overall, the best model is the one with slopes only for the ordering condition and a diagonal 
covariance matrix, which offers significant improvement over both the model without any 
slopes (𝜒2(24 − 20) = 353.2 − 184.6 ⟺ 𝜒2(4) = 168.6, p<.0005) and the model with 
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slopes for the ordering factor, but with a variance components covariance matrix  
(𝜒2(24 − 21) = 353.2 − 184.6 ⟺ 𝜒2(3) = 168.6, p<.0005). 
 Finally, for descriptive purposes, we present figures analogous to Figure 3, but split 
across profession and case. One observes a pattern consistent with that in Figure 3 across 
most cases. As these comparisons are offered for illustration, for simplicity, we just ran 
ordinary independent samples t-tests, with a single fixed effect corresponding to single vs. 
double ratings (singe vs. double). For each cell we indicate whether the finding is consistent 











meandouble rating= .03 
meansingle rating =.03 
t(34)=.04, p=.97 
meandouble rating= .06 
meansingle rating l= .05 
t(35)=.16, p=.88 
meandouble rating= .08 
meansingle rating =.10 
t(31)=-.26, p=.80 
Anna 
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meandouble rating=.93 
meansingle rating =0.89 
t(31)=.94, p=.35 
meandouble rating=.97 
meansingle rating =.97 
t(35)=.17, p=.86 
meandouble rating=.93 





meansingle rating =.00 
(t(33)=.81, p=.42) 
meandouble rating=.04 
meansingle rating =.01 
t(35)=1.93, p=.06 
meandouble rating=.06 
meansingle rating =.04 
t(31)=.63, p=.54 
Joanna 
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meandoubleratingHD=.95 
meansingle rating HD=.94 
meandoubleratingDH=.64 
meansingle rating DH=.68 
 
Inconsistent with prediction 
in DH condition, 
intermediate (red) judgment 
does not produce more 
health (t(13)=-.19, p=.85). 
Inconsistent with prediction 
in HD condition, 
intermediate (red) judgment 
does not produce more 
disorder (t(19)=.21, p=.84).   
meandoubleratingHD=.98 
meansingle rating HD=.80 
meandoubleratingDH=.34 
meansingle rating DH=.61 
 
Inconsistent with prediction 
in DH condition, 
intermediate (red) judgment 
does not produce more 
health (t(16)=-1.52, p=.15); 
in HD conditions 
differences consistent with 
predictions, intermediate 
judgment produces more 
disorder (t(17)=2.51, p<.05) 
meandoubleratingHD=.90 
meansingle rating HD=.80 
meandoubleratingDH=.42 
meansingle rating DH=.80 
 
Consistent with predictions in 
DH condition, intermediate 
(red) judgment produces 
more health (t(12)=-2.59, 
p<.05);  
in HD condition ns 
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meandoubleratingHD=.76 
meansingle rating HD=.81 
meandoubleratingDH=.20 
meansingle rating DH=.70 
 
Consistent with predictions 










meansingle rating HD=.69 
meandoubleratingDH=.23 
meansingle rating DH=.79 
 
Consistent with predictions 
in DH condition, 
intermediate judgment 
produces more health (16)=-
3.25, p<.01); 






meansingle rating HD=.72 
meandoubleratingDH=.34 
meansingle rating DH=.62 
 
ns differences 
inconsistent with predictions 
in HD condition t(16)=-1.02, 
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meandoubleratingHD=.93 
meansingle rating HD=.90 
meandoubleratingDH=.20 
meansingle rating DH=.64 
 
Consistent with predictions 
in DH condition, 
intermediate judgment 
produces more health 
(t(12)=-2.54, p<.05); 






meansingle rating HD=.86 
meandoubleratingDH=.26 
meansingle rating DH=.66 
 
Consistent with predictions 
in DH condition, 
intermediate judgment 
produces more health 
t(14)=-2.46, p<.05); 
In HD condition ns 
differences 
inconsistent with predictions 
(t(19)=-.27, p=.79 
meandoubleratingHD=.93 
meansingle rating HD=.85 
meandoubleratingDH=.33 
meansingle rating DH=.77 
 
Consistent with predictions in 
DH condition, intermediate 
judgment produces more 
health t(13)=-3.18, p<.01; 
In HD condition ns 
differences 
inconsistent with predictions 
(t(16)=1.15, p=.27 
Marta 
Constructive biases 47 
 
meandoubleratingHD=.85 
meansingle rating HD=.75 
meandoubleratingDH=.22 
meansingle rating DH=.78 
 
Consistent with predictions 










meansingle rating HD=.73 
meandoubleratingDH=.32 
meansingle rating DH=.51 
 
ns differences 




meansingle rating HD=.70 
meandoubleratingDH=.21 
meansingle rating DH=.68 
 
Consistent with predictions in 
DH condition, intermediate 
judgment produces more 
health (t(13)=-3.57, p<.01; 
In HD condition ns 
differences 
inconsistent with predictions 
(t(16)=.27, p=.79) 
Oliwia 
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meandouble rating=.83 
meansingle rating =.90 
t(34)=-.98, p=.34 
meandouble rating=.85 
meansingle rating =.92 
t(35)=-1.07, p=.29 
meandouble rating=.81 
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Appendix 3 
  
We summarize the mathematical formulation for the basic quantum model, the noisy quantum 
model, and the belief adjustment model, for the evaluation bias. The basic quantum model and 
the belief adjudgment model for the evaluation bias are presented in detail in White et al. 
(2020), so here we offer only a description of the main technical tools and the equations. The 
noisy quantum model is a novel proposal and we show the algebra in more detail. We do not 
offer a detailed tutorial on quantum methods, but instead refer readers to Busemeyer and 
Bruza (2012) or Pothos and Busemeyer (2013) and references therein.  
 Regarding the basic quantum model, recall from main text and Figure 4 that there is an 
initial state vector, a rotation, and a projection. Projections are modeled using so-called 
projection operators, 𝑃𝑥, which are linear operators. Then, the projection of state 𝜓 onto 
subspace X is given by 𝑃𝑥𝜓, which is just a vector along subspace X. Also, probabilities are 
computed by squaring the length of these projections, e.g., 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋; 𝜓) = |𝑃𝑥𝜓|
2 (the vertical 
bars indicate length). Note, this rule relating probabilities to subspaces is a key assumption 
distinguishing quantum theory from projective linear algebra. In the real spaces we employ 
here, rotations are implemented with just rotation operators, e.g., a clockwise rotation of 
vector 𝜓 by angle 𝜃 is given by 𝑈(𝜃) ∙ 𝜓, where 𝑈(𝜃) = (
cos 𝜃 sin 𝜃
−sin 𝜃 cos 𝜃
). That is, 𝑈(𝜃) ∙ 𝜓 
is a vector rotated by 𝜃 radians from 𝜓, in a clockwise direction. In quantum theory, the 
operator 𝑈(𝜃) is an example of a so-called unitary operator, whose main properties are  
⟨?̂?𝜓|?̂?𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝜓|𝜑⟩, so that ?̂?−1 = ?̂?† (the ‘dagger’ indicates the complex conjugate of the 
transpose). Given these simple tools, it is straightforward to specify the basic quantum model.  
 Consider the disorder-health condition. Define a normalized vector along the disorder 
ray, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷. Recall that in the disorder-health condition the initial mental state vector is 
assumed to be close to the disorder ray (since the initial information is for disorder the mental 
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state is set in a way to indicate a high probability for disorder). Note, the initial mental state 
vector could be placed either on the left or the right of the disorder ray. The particular 
placement can be justified in terms of what happens if we consider the impact of a series of 
successive judgments (White et al., 2020). Then, we can write 𝜓𝐷 = 𝑈(−𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷, which just tells us that 𝜓𝐷 can be identified as a vector rotated in an anticlockwise 
way, by rating degrees, from 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷 (this is just a technical convenience in how to define 
the initial state, that is, as a rotation from a state of known position). In main text, we noted 
that introducing the health information would lead to a rotation towards the health ray and, in 
Figure 4, this rotation was shown as a rotation in a clockwise direction. The direction of 
rotation is simply the same as the direction of a projection, if a judgment were to be made 
(White et al., 2020). For example, in disorder-health cases, given that the state vector is 
placed in the top left quadrant, a projection would require collapse in a clockwise direction. 
The equations for the basic quantum model essentially follow:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅; 𝜓𝐷) = |𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∙ 𝜓𝐷|
2…………………………….………………..…...…..(1) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅; 𝜓𝐷) = |𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∙ 𝑈𝐻(𝑛) ∙ 𝜓𝐷|
2………………………………………….…....(2) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅; 𝜓𝐷) = |𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∙ 𝑈𝐻(𝑛) ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷|
2……………..…..…………………….(3) 
 
 The subscript H in the case of 𝑈𝐻(𝑛) indicates that the rotation corresponds to the 
introduction of information that the patient is healthy. These equations have two free 
parameters, n and rating, the latter required for the specification of 𝜓𝐷 = 𝑈(−𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷. A few notes are necessary. First, these equations assume that in the disorder-health 
condition, the first judgment, if asked for, would indicate disorder. Second, if the information 
is health-disorder, then in Equation (2) 𝑛 → −𝑛 and in Equation (3) the state is 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐻, 
since we now assume that the first decision indicated health. Third, the reason why in all 
cases the final projector is 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 is that all the participant data correspond to how likely it 
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is that the subject is suffering from an eating disorder. Therefore, the model likewise produces 
a probability for an eating disorder. Fourth, the impact of the second piece of information on 
the mental state is the same, regardless of whether the mental state is the initial one (𝜓𝐷) or 
the one after a decision for the first stimulus (if the first decision indicates disorder, then this 
would be 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷).  
 Regarding the noisy quantum model, even though conceptually the introduction of 
noise (in the form of a mismatch between judgment and change in mental state vector) is 
straightforward, there are various technical elaborations, which are less straightforward. First, 
instead of employing a mental vector state 𝜓, we have to employ a so-called density operator 
𝜌. A density operator 𝜌 can be set up to closely correspond to a particular mental state vector, 
and this is the approach in the present work, that is, e.g. 𝜌𝐷 is specified in a way closely 
analogous to 𝜓𝐷. Second, the probability rule is different, instead of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋; 𝜓) = |𝑃𝑥𝜓|
2, 
we have 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋; 𝜌) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑃𝑥𝜌), where Tr indicates the Trace operator, which sums matrix 
elements along the diagonal. For example, the trace of matrix(
𝑎 𝑏
𝑐 𝑑
) is just a+d. Third, 
instead of projectors 𝑃𝑥, we employ positive operator valued measures (POVMs). A POVM is 
just like a projector, but for the fact that there is a small probability that there will be a 
mismatch between answer and response. Note that a POVM can be decomposed into two 
measurement operators, so that 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑀 = 𝑀𝑃 ∙ 𝑀𝑃
†
 (the † indicates conjugate transpose of a 
matrix; in the present model 𝑀𝑃 = 𝑀𝑃
†
). The measurement operators are necessary for 
specifying the state post-measurement.  
 Is it not possible to have a POVM model with mental state vectors, as for the basic 
quantum model? It is possible. However, depending on the POVM, an initial so-called pure 
state (that is, one that can be represented by a state vector), might not stay that way under 
measurements. That is, measuring with a POVM might turn a pure state into one that has to be 
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represented with a density operator (a mixed state). So, when using POVMs, it is more 
appropriate to employ density operators.  
 The first two equations for the noisy quantum model follow:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅; 𝜌𝐷) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑀 ∙ 𝜌𝐷)………………………………………………(4) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅; 𝜌𝐷) = 𝑇𝑟 (𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑀 ∙ 𝑈(𝑛) ∙ 𝜌𝐷 ∙ 𝑈
†(𝑛))………………………………(5) 
 
 For SSDR, we first need to identify the state following the judgment for the first piece 
of information. The collapse postulate in quantum theory works analogously for state vectors 
and density operators. Assuming the answer following the first piece of information is 









𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅; 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟) = 𝑇𝑟 (𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑀 ∙ 𝑈(𝑛) ∙ 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟 ∙ 𝑈
†(𝑛))……...(7)  
 To make equations 4-7 intelligible, we need to present in more detail the various 
elements. The main components of the model are as follows:  
𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0
0 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
), 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 = (
𝜖 0
0 1 − 𝜖
), 𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ = (
1 − 𝜖 0
0 𝜖
) and the 
corresponding measurement operators are 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟
† = (√
𝜖 0




1 − 𝜖 0
0 √𝜖
). Note, 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 can be 𝜌𝐷 if the first stimulus indicates 
disorder or 𝜌𝐻 if health. Also, we will skip noting POVM in projector names, and just assume 
this in what follows. The parameter 𝜖 is the error rate for mismatching answers and 
projections. Then, for each of the three possible ratings in the experiment, we can write:  
 
FSDR 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟; 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙) = 𝑇𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙) =
𝑇𝑟 ((
𝜖 0
0 1 − 𝜖
) (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0
0 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
)) = 𝑇𝑟 (
𝜖 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0
0 (1 − 𝜖) ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)
) = 𝜖 ∙
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝜖 + 𝜖 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 1 − (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 2 ∙ 𝜖 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝜖) = 1 −
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅 = 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ; 𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙).  
 
SSSR 
For the case of disorder-health, we have:  




0 1 − 𝜖
) (
cos 𝑛 sin 𝑛
−sin 𝑛 cos 𝑛
) (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0
0 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
) (
cos 𝑛 − sin 𝑛
sin 𝑛 cos 𝑛
))
= 𝑇𝑟 ((
1 − 𝜖 0
0 𝜖
) (
cos 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 sin 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)
−sin 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 cos 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)
) (
cos 𝑛 − sin 𝑛
sin 𝑛 cos 𝑛
)) = 
= 𝑇𝑟 ((
(1 − 𝜖) ∙ cos 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (1 − 𝜖) ∙ sin 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)
−𝜖 ∙ sin 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝜖 ∙ cos 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)
) (
cos 𝑛 − sin 𝑛
sin 𝑛 cos 𝑛
))
=  𝑇𝑟 (
(1 − 𝜖) ∙ (cos2 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + sin2 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)) …
… 𝜖 ∙ (sin2 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + cos2 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔))
) 
= (1 − 𝜖) ∙ (cos2 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + sin2 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)) + 𝜖
∙ (sin2 𝑛 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + cos2 𝑛 ∙ (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)) 
 
That is, for the case of health-disorder, we need only assume a rotation of -n, instead of n.  
 
SSDR 















0 √1 − 𝜖
) (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 0
0 1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
) (√
𝜖 0
0 √1 − 𝜖
)
= (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖 0
0 (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙ (1 − 𝜖)
) 
 
So, 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟 = (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖 0





Similar algebra shows that:  
 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟= (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ (1 − 𝜖) 0






To summarize so far, if FSDR indicates a disorder answer, then the state is 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟. If 
FSDR indicates a health answer, then the state is 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟. These states take into 
account the possibility of mismatch between response and projection. Then,  
 




𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖 0
0 (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙ (1 − 𝜖)





0 1 − 𝜖
) (
cos 𝑛 sin 𝑛
−sin 𝑛 cos 𝑛
) (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖 0
0 (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙ (1 − 𝜖)
) (
cos 𝑛 − sin 𝑛





cos 𝑛 ∙ 𝜖 sin 𝑛 ∙ 𝜖
−sin 𝑛 (1 − 𝜖) cos 𝑛 (1 − 𝜖)
) (
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖 cos 𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖(− sin 𝑛)





cos2 𝑛 ∙ 𝜖2 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + (1 − 𝜖)𝜖 sin2 𝑛 (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) …
… sin2 𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∙ 𝜖(1 − 𝜖) + cos2 𝑛 (1 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) ∙ (1 − 𝜖)2
)
=
cos2 𝑛∙𝜖2∙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔+(1−𝜖)𝜖 sin2 𝑛(1−𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)+sin2 𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔∙𝜖(1−𝜖)+cos2 𝑛(1−𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)∙(1−𝜖)2
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐷;𝜌𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙)
 
Similar algebra shows that  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅; 𝜌𝐹𝑆𝐷𝑅,𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟)
=
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 This completes the presentation of the noisy quantum model. The superficially 
complex algebra should not obscure the fact that essentially all we have done is replace state 
vectors with density operators and projector operators with POVMs.  
 We next consider the application of Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) belief adjustment 
model to the present data. The model is a powerful framework for describing the way an 
overall judgment is formulated as a result of a sequence of pieces of evidence. However, it 
involves several parameters and choices in equations which make it difficult to apply it to the 
simple case of the evaluation bias paradigm. As noted in text, we follow the approach of 
White et al. (2020), who offered a reasonable series of restrictions to the model, so it can be 
applied more or less on equal footing to the quantum models.  
 When considering a set of k statements, parameter 𝑆𝑘 (0 ≤ 𝑆𝑘 ≤ 1) corresponds to the 
current evaluation after the kth piece of evidence, parameter 𝑠(𝑥𝑘) to the evaluation for just the 
kth piece of evidence, and 𝑠(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘) to the evaluation of statements 1 to k together; in this 
case, 0 ≤ 𝑠(𝑥𝑘) ≤ 1. Each piece of evidence is assessed against a reference point R and there 
is a weight which determines how the assessment of the kth piece of evidence informs the 
current evaluation. These parameters are related by the main equation in the model:  
𝑆𝑘 = 𝑆𝑘−1 + 𝑤𝑘[𝑠(𝑥𝑘) − 𝑅]………………………………………………………………………………………………………..(8) 
 
  
 For an SbS process, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) proposed different versions of the 
model, depending on e.g. whether the rating scale is unipolar or bipolar. Given the present 
paradigm adopted unipolar rating scales, the reference parameter R can be set as 𝑅 = 𝑆𝑘−1. 
The updating weight, 𝑤𝑘, depends on whether the current piece of evidence is evaluated more 
highly relative to the reference point or less highly, and two separate sensitivity parameters, 
which in the present case can be, fairly safely, set to 1. Putting all these assumptions together 
(see White et al., 2020, for details), the SbS process for the evaluation bias paradigm involves 
the equations:  
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𝑆𝐷𝐻 = (1 − 𝑆𝐷)𝑆𝐷 + 𝑆𝐷𝑠(𝑥𝐻)…………………………………………………………………………………………………….(9a) 
𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆0
2 + (1 − 𝑆0)𝑠(𝑥𝐷)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..(9b) 
and  
𝑆𝐻𝐷 = 𝑆𝐻
2 + (1 − 𝑆𝐻)𝑠(𝑥𝐷)…………………………………………………………………………………………………….(10a) 
𝑆𝐻 = (1 − 𝑆0)𝑆0 + 𝑆0𝑠(𝑥𝐻)…………………………………………………………………………………………………….(10b) 
 
 Some explanatory remarks are necessary. The subscripts follow the convention in the 
rest of this paper, so that H indicates health and D disorder. 𝑆0 is the initial evaluation of the 
participant, following the presentation of the first piece of information; this is a free parameter 
of the model, analogous to the rating parameter in the quantum models. 𝑆𝐷 and 𝑆𝐻 are the 
participant evaluations after the first piece of information. 𝑠(𝑥𝐻) and 𝑠(𝑥𝐷) are the participant 
evaluations after observing information indicating health and disorder, respectively. So, for 
example, Equation (9b) tells us that the participant’s initial state 𝑆0 is adjusted by the presence 
of disorder information, 𝑠(𝑥𝐷), and leads to new state 𝑆𝐷 -- the subscript D in 𝑆𝐷 indicates our 
expectation that this belief state would indicate disorder. We set 𝑠(𝑥𝑃) = 1 − 𝑠(𝑥𝑁) so that 
𝑠(𝑥𝑃) is the second parameter of the SbS part of Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) model.  
 The EoS part is analogously specified, but instead of there being multiple evaluation 
steps, there is a single one, 𝑆𝑘 = 𝑆0 + 𝑤𝑘[𝑠(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑘) − 𝑅]. We can set parameters R and 𝑤𝑘 
using the same kind of reasoning as for the SbS process. The end result is summarized in the 
following equations:  
𝑆𝐷𝐻 = 𝑆0 + 𝑆0[𝑠(𝑥𝑃 , 𝑥𝑁) − 𝑆0]…………………….……………………………………………………………………….(11a) 
 
𝑆𝐻𝐷 = 𝑆0 + (1 − 𝑆0)[𝑠(𝑥𝐻 , 𝑥𝐷) − 𝑆0]…………………………………………………………………………………….(11b) 
 
 Parameters 𝑠(𝑥𝐷 , 𝑥𝐻), 𝑠(𝑥𝐻 , 𝑥𝐷) are the overall evaluations of two pieces of information 
provided, in the disorder, health order (first parameter) or the health, disorder order (second 
parameter). Because we wanted to fit the models separately for each triplet of data points, 
FSDR, SSDR, SSSR, as things stand Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) model is 
overparameterized; there are four parameters, 𝑆0, 𝑠(𝑥𝐷), 𝑠(𝑥𝐷 , 𝑥𝐻), 𝑠(𝑥𝐻 , 𝑥𝐷). One approach to 
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avoid this problem is to set 𝑠(𝑥𝐷 , 𝑥𝐻) = 𝑠(𝑥𝐻) and analogously for 𝑠(𝑥𝐻 , 𝑥𝐷), as White et al. 
(2020) did, which introduces a bias for recency in the model. In the present dataset, this is a 
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Appendix 4 
 
In this section we consider the details of fitting the three models. Because the 
paradigm involved highly distinctive case studies of eating disorder patients and because it 
was impractical to create too many different cases, each participant provided a handful of 
judgments and in no instance did we have a triplet of FSDR, SSDR, and SSSR judgments, for 
the same patient case, from the same participant. Therefore, we fitted the models using item-
based analyses. There were four triplets corresponding to disorder-health cases and two to 
disorder-disorder cases, which were considered together (we will refer to these as disorder-
health); there were four triplets corresponding to health-disorder cases or health-health cases, 
which were also considered together (referred to as health-disorder). 
As noted in main text, each triplet is three datapoints {FSDR, SSDR, SSSR}. For each 
triplet separately, for the basic quantum model, we used the FSDR and SSSR judgments to 
determine the two parameters of rating and n. Given these two parameters, the model’s 
prediction for SSDR follows. In the case of the basic quantum model, the two parameters 
were extracted using the FindRoot function in Mathematica – one parameter was extracted 
using the FSDR rating and the other using the SSSR rating (in both cases, one question for 
one unknown). Given the two parameters, we used the equation for SSDR to obtain the 
prediction from the quantum model. In the case of the noisy quantum model, parameter 
extraction was the same as for the basic quantum model, but we employed a simple grid 
search regarding the noise parameter; for each possible value of the noise parameter (in steps 
of 0.1), we computed best parameters and fit, and retained the solution with best fit. In the 
case of the belief adjustment model, we extracted the two model parameters using the 
FindMinimum function in Mathematica and a cost term based on sums of squares – even 
though here too we have two equations with two unknowns, we could not always identify 
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parameter values exactly satisfying them (as for the quantum model), which is why 
FindMinimum had to be employed. As for the other models, given the two parameter values, 
a prediction for SSDR follows from the belief adjustment model. So, all three models were 
assessed in a similar way. Note, given the small number of data points (12 triplets) no cross-
validation was carried out.   
To summarize so far, the success or not of any of the models is determined by 
comparing the 12 predicted SSDR values against the 12 observed SSDR values. To reiterate, 
predicted SSDR values correspond to probabilities for disorder and observed SSDR values to 
suitably scaled ratings for disorder.  
 For each model, the 12 predicted and observed SSDR values were compared using 
residual sum of squares (RSS) and 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 𝑁 ∙ ln (
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑁
) + 𝑝 ∙ ln (𝑁) with N=6 and p=0 vs. 1; 
lower values of BIC indicate better fit. Note, for the disorder-health condition the noisy 
quantum model produces a few equivalent solutions (to two decimal places for residual sums 
of squares) in the vicinity of 𝜖 = 0.5; we show a solution just off the value 𝜖 = 0.5, since 
otherwise all predicted probabilities are at 0.5.  
 Finally, in main text, Table 3 shows exact values for the 12 predicted and observed 
SSDR values. Here, we offer a plot which shows the correspondence between predicted and 
observed SSDR values, Figure A3.1.  
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Figure A3.1. The 12 SSDR values are presented in ascending order. Next to each case name 
we note whether the FSDR judgment is from an HH (health-health), DH (disorder-health), 
HD (health-disorder), or DD (disorder-disorder) pair.  
